If this book can be said to have heroes and villains, the heroes are the Marines and the villains the one-dimensional army thinkers like William Westmoreland and Colin Powell whose strategies have been a disaster for American arms and prestige. Max Boot, the editorial features editor of The Wall Street Journal, has examined the limited wars that dominate American military history and are the rule to which the Civil War, the two World Wars, and Korea are the exceptions. These limited wars can be variously termed, among other things, counterinsurgencies, sublimited wars, low-intensity conflicts, or the wonderful new coinage “military operations other than war,” but Mr. Boot settles on “small wars” (the actual translation of the Spanish “guerilla”).

In the post-Civil War era, the Marine Corps, which had existed in various forms since 1775, gained a motto, a march, and a mission. The government was beginning to take an interest in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and troops were needed to help stabilize some very unstable countries. The missions tended to take four basic forms: punitive raids or campaigns, protection of Americans or American interests in a foreign country, the pacification of rebellious and marauding populations, and the annexation of land or trade concessions (Mr. Boot calls this last item “profiteering” to maintain the alliteration). Between 1898 and 1940, Marines fought “small wars” in China, the Philippines, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, in some cases more than once and often on a long-term